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DCI/ICS 85-4093 28 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:	Director, Intelligence Community Staff
FROM:	Chairman, Information Handling Committee

l. The attached memorandum to Secretary Schultz (Attachment A) for the Director's consideration has been prepared per your instructions of 27 August. I presume you will want to brief him on this yourself and have included some background information. We have handled the matter of providing State the money for the system fix via separate memorandum over D/ICS signature, noting therein that the DCI is contemplating action to mitigate the security risks and will communicate with the Secretary of State. (S

Restricting SCI Dissemination to INR

2. Also attached are memoranda for your signature to DIRNSA, CIA, Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Chairman, COMIREX (Attachments B thru E) regarding implementation of the envisioned dissemination restrictions. We have talked with these organizations and generally determined that restricting the message traffic flow to INR will not be difficult to accomplish. However, assuring INR at least a minimally effective alternative service via courier will take time to work out, given the number of reporting organizations involved and the fact that arrangements will have to be worked out separately by each. (S)

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Attachments: As stated

SUBJECT:

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director, CIA Deputy Director for Administration Deputy Director for Intelligence Deputy Director for Operations Deputy Director for Operations Deputy Director for Science and Technology FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Temporary Suspension of Electrical Dissemination of Highly Sensitive Intelligence to State INR 1. Based on a comprehensive computer security (COMPUSEC) assessment of the Department of State's automated system which supports its intelligence analysts within the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), it has been determined that there is a high risk of compromise of sensitive intelligence materials electrically transmitted to State INR. Technical enhancements whi must be made to the system to correct this situation cannot be completed before 1 April 1986. 3. Please advise when the foregoing measures have been implemented and any difficulties encountered. Point of contact is Staff, John N. McMahon		SECRET
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